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RTT· red team

RTT · red team

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Techniques›Credentials & User Impersonation›LDAP Relay Attack

Credentials & User Impersonation

LDAP Relay Attack

T1557.001 · MITRE ATT&CK

Relay NTLM authentication from a coerced or otherwise prompted domain principal to a Domain Controller's LDAP/LDAPS service. If effective LDAP protections do not reject the bind, the relayed principal can perform only directory operations allowed by its rights; possible follow-on actions include creating a computer account, changing the domain ACL to grant replication rights for a separate DCSync action, configuring Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD), or registering a Shadow Credential.

ArtifactsRESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

EDR HooksRESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Steps1

CategoryNTLM/Kerberos Relaying

SourceExternal

Discuss in Advisor

Walkthrough

Step 1

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Requirements: none specified (operational prerequisites may still apply)

Check before starting: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Variant:

Full outcome coverage

printerbug · Coerce Authentication via MS-RPRN

Coerce Authentication via MS-RPRN

powershell

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Version: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER. Requirements: ALL(RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER)Documents all requested outcomes. This is a candidate, not proof of execution or compatibility.preconditions: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERdependencies: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERverification: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERfailure modes: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERlimitations: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Detection signal

Detection 01

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Mitigations

Mitigation 01

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

OPSEC notes

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

References

Extended details

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER