Adversaries may leverage an active user's SSH agent or an accessible agent socket to authenticate laterally using identities already loaded in that agent. This abuses an existing trust relationship; access to the agent permits signing requests but does not reveal the private key. Using an agent socket to run `ssh` can create a new SSH login, which is distinct from taking over an already-established SSH transport connection.
Requirements: none specified (operational prerequisites may still apply)
Check before starting: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER
Variant:
Full outcome coverage
asktgt · Request a Kerberos TGT
Request a Kerberos TGT
powershell
RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER
Version: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER. Requirements: ALL(RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER)Documents all requested outcomes. This is a candidate, not proof of execution or compatibility.Shell: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER. Privileges: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER.preconditions: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERdependencies: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERverification: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERfailure modes: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERlimitations: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER