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Techniques›Credentials & User Impersonation›LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning

Credentials & User Impersonation

LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning

T1557.001 · MITRE ATT&CK

Responding to local LLMNR, NBT-NS, or mDNS name queries can direct a client to an unauthorized host; if the client then authenticates, that host may receive NTLM challenge-response material. This is not a reusable NT password hash or plaintext password. ATT&CK T1557.001 includes both name-resolution poisoning and SMB relay. This entry's procedure is passive analysis only and does not attempt poisoning, credential collection, cracking, or relay.

Steps1

CategoryNTLM/Kerberos Relaying

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Walkthrough

Step 1

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Requirements: unknown (requirements need clarification)

Check before starting: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Coverage Gap: No catalog tool command currently produces this step's declared outcomes.

Detection signal

Detection 01

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Mitigations

Mitigation 01

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

References

Extended details

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER