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RTT· red team

RTT · red team

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Techniques›Domain Enumeration›Kerberos Delegation Enumeration

Domain Enumeration

Kerberos Delegation Enumeration

T1087.002 · MITRE ATT&CK

Enumerate Active Directory user and computer account objects configured for unconstrained delegation (TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION), constrained delegation (msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, with or without protocol transition), or Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity). The results identify delegating principals, delegation type, service targets, and RBCD trustees for security review; enumeration alone does not establish exploitability or prove privilege escalation or lateral movement.

ArtifactsRESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

EDR HooksRESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Steps1

CategoryAD Enumeration

Discuss in Advisor

Walkthrough

Step 1

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Requirements: ALL(RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER)

Check before starting: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Variant:

Full outcome coverage

Active Directory PowerShell module · Enumerate Domain Users

Enumerate Domain Users

powershell

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Version: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER. Requirements: ALL(RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER)Documents all requested outcomes. This is a candidate, not proof of execution or compatibility.Shell: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER. Privileges: not documented.preconditions: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERdependencies: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERverification: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERfailure modes: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERlimitations: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Detection signal

Detection 01

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Mitigations

Mitigation 01

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

OPSEC notes

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

References

Extended details

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER