Advanced Search Keywords:

opsec:low - Show techniques with low noise level (stealthy)
phase:"initial access" - Filter by phase (use quotes for spaces)
category:lateral - Filter by category
platform:windows - Filter by platform
tag:credential - Find items with specific tag in results
external:true - Show only external techniques

Combining Keywords:

tag:stealth phase:"initial access" password

Searches for "password" within low-noise techniques in the initial access phase

RTT· red team

RTT · red team

Advanced Search Keywords:

opsec:low - Show techniques with low noise level (stealthy)
phase:"initial access" - Filter by phase (use quotes for spaces)
category:lateral - Filter by category
platform:windows - Filter by platform
tag:credential - Find items with specific tag in results
external:true - Show only external techniques

Combining Keywords:

tag:stealth phase:"initial access" password

Searches for "password" within low-noise techniques in the initial access phase

Search techniques, tools, commands…⌘K

No scenario

No scenario · all techniques in scope

IdleStatus

0Scenarios

Advanced Search Keywords:

opsec:low - Show techniques with low noise level (stealthy)
phase:"initial access" - Filter by phase (use quotes for spaces)
category:lateral - Filter by category
platform:windows - Filter by platform
tag:credential - Find items with specific tag in results
external:true - Show only external techniques

Combining Keywords:

tag:stealth phase:"initial access" password

Searches for "password" within low-noise techniques in the initial access phase

Back to Techniques

Techniques›Credentials & User Impersonation›Entra ID Connect MSOL/ADSync account abuse

Credentials & User Impersonation

Entra ID Connect MSOL/ADSync account abuse

T1003.006 · MITRE ATT&CK

Microsoft Entra Connect's on-premises AD DS connector account (often auto-generated with an MSOL_ name) is separate from the ADSync service account. When password hash synchronization is enabled, the connector account is typically granted Replicate Directory Changes and Replicate Directory Changes All rights, which allow directory replication for password synchronization. Compromise of this connector account or the Tier 0 sync server can expose synchronized-directory credentials and affect hybrid identity control. The connector credential is stored encrypted in the ADSync database with its key material protected by Windows DPAPI; account rights and setup details depend on enabled features and installation history.

Steps1

CategoryCredential Abuse

Discuss in Advisor

Walkthrough

Step 1

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Requirements: ALL(RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER)

Variant:

Full outcome coverage

dementor · Scoped multicast name-resolution poisoning

Scoped multicast name-resolution poisoning

powershell

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Version: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER. Requirements: none specified (operational prerequisites may still apply)Documents all requested outcomes. This is a candidate, not proof of execution or compatibility.preconditions: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERdependencies: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERverification: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERfailure modes: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKERlimitations: RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

Mitigations

Mitigation 01

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER

References

Extended details

RESTRICTED_ACCESS_BLUR_MARKER