noPac

The cube0x0 C#/.NET noPac.exe implementation targets CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. Its scanner enumerates domain controllers, requests a TGT from each, and reports TGT receipt plus ticket byte length; it does not parse PAC contents, so the length is only a heuristic and cannot establish patch or enforcement state. Its exploit creates or reuses a computer account, clears its servicePrincipalName values, changes its sAMAccountName to a DC name, requests a TGT, changes the sAMAccountName back to the supplied machine-account value, then uses S4U2Self to obtain a service ticket. /ptt submits that ticket to the current logon session. This implementation does not restore SPNs or delete the computer object, so operators must verify and clean up its state. Ticket issuance does not prove access to every service or local SYSTEM. The separately maintained Ridter Python noPac.py commands retained under the second version run the SAM THE ADMIN exploitation chain, not a scan: the normal path creates and renames a temporary computer account, restores its sAMAccountName, requests a service ticket, then deletes the created account after ticket acquisition; failures or interruption can leave partial state. The non-destructive scanner is the project's separate scanner.py. A ticket does not establish service authorization, and -dump chains secretsdump for credential material.